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NATURAL KINDS AND BIOLOGICAL TAXA' 
John Dupre 
The main topic of this paper is the theory of natural kinds that 
has been developed by Putnam2 and Kripke.3 One area 
to which this analysis has seemed particularly appropriate is 
that of general terms naming biological organisms. My strategy 
will be to compare the requirements of this analysis with some 
actual biological facts and theories. It will appear that these 
diverge to an extent which, I will claim, is fatal to the theory. 
Toward the end of the paper I will also make some more con- 
structive remarks about the nature of biological classification. 
In the first section of the paper I will outline the theory in 
question, particularly as it has been developed by Putnam, and 
touch on some related historical and contemporary issues. In 
the second section I will assume the interpretation of biological 
taxonomy most favorable to Putnam's theory, and show that even 
this is often not as Putnam needs it to be. In the third section I 
will move to a more defensible account of biological taxonomy 
that renders the theory increasingly untenable. In the fourth sec- 
tion I will make some more constructive remarks about the rela- 
tions between different ways of classifying organisms, and in the 
fifth and final section I will discuss the nature of species. The 
account I will offer, I believe, lends support to the contentions 
of earlier sections. 
1 I would like to thank Gordon Baker, who first suggested to me the philo- 
sophical interest of biological taxonomy, Nancy Cartwright and David 
Lewis, who made invaluable criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper, and most 
especially John Perry, who not only made many valuable criticisms of detail, 
but is also responsible for a much improved presentation of the entire paper. 
2 H. Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality, II (Cambridge, 1975). Especially 
"The Meaning of 'Meaning"' (MM), "Is Semantics Possible?" (SP), and "Ex- 
planation and Reference" (ER). 
3 S. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. 
D. Davidson and G. Harman (Dordrecht, 1972), pp. 253-355. Also, "Identity 
and Necessity," in Identity and Individuation, ed. M. Munitz (New York, 1972), 
pp. 135-64. 
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I 
A good point of entry to the present issue is provided by Locke's 
theory of real and nominal essences. The distinction between 
real and nominal essence is, roughly, that between what accounts 
for the properties characteristic of a particular kind ("the being 
of anything whereby it is what it is"4), and the means whereby 
we distinguish things as belonging to that kind ("the abstract 
idea which the general, or sortal . . . name stands for"5). For 
something like a triangle, which Locke took to be a wholly con- 
ceptual object, the real and nominal essences coincide. Since 
the properties of a triangle flow only from the way it is defined, 
contemplation of the latter could provide insight into the former. 
But one point of the distinction was to emphasize the futility 
of the scholastic, contemplative view of science. Contemplation 
of forms, nominal essences if anything, would be a source of 
knowledge of real substances only if nominal essences were also 
real essences. But they are not, so it is not. In the case of material 
things Locke, like his successors, thought that the real essence 
was some feature of the microscopic structure; i.e., that the 
microscopic structure was the real source of the phenomenal 
properties of a thing, and that microstructural similarities 
accounted for the homogeneity of macroscopic kinds. Of the 
practical value of this notion, on the other hand, Locke was 
skeptical. Regretting, famously, our lack of microscopic eyes, he 
doubted whether knowledge of real essences was possible, and 
also whether real essences, if they were discovered, would co- 
incide with the nominal kinds we had previously distinguished. 
Thus he held that sorts of things were demarcated by nominal 
essences only.6 Subsequent scientific history has convinced some 
philosophers that Locke's skepticism was premature. Chemistry 
and physics have, since Locke's time, revealed a good deal about 
the microstructure of things, and antecedently-distinguished 
classes of things have proved to share important structural 
properties. 
4J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Fraser (Oxford, 1894), 
Vol. II, bk. III , ch. 3, 15, p. 26. 
Loc. cit. 
6 Op. cit., bk. III, ch. 6, 8, p. 63. 
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The contemporary theory I want to discuss may now be crudely 
stated in Lockean terms as follows: (1) real essences demarcate 
natural kinds; (2) such natural kinds provide the extension of 
many terms in ordinary language. The theory does not attempt to 
conflate real and nominal essence. As we will see, Putnam has 
a theory of meaning that incorporates, and sharply distinguishes, 
both real and nominal essence. But it is the real essence that is 
supposed to determine the extension of the term. It is with the 
feasibility of this role that I will be mainly concerned. 
Henceforward, I will use the term "natural kind" to refer to a 
class of objects defined by common possession of some theoreti- 
cally important property (generally, but not necessarily, micro- 
structural).7 The traditional view, to which Locke may be 
counted a subscriber, is that terms of ordinary language refer 
to kinds whose extension is determined by a nominal essence, 
and hence not to natural kinds;8 and that science, on the other 
hand, attempts to discover those kinds that are demarcated by 
real essences. It is compatible with this view that in some cases 
real and nominal kinds will coincide. But this would be largely 
fortuitous. This position does not require that ordinary language 
is entirely independent of science, for several reasons. First, the 
explanation of our recognition of a kind might, in some cases, 
trace back to a theoretical feature that defined a natural kind. 
Second, terms that originate in scientific theory may become 
incorporated in ordinary language; we should certainly not 
suppose that these are separated by a sharp or impassable bound- 
ary. And third, it is widely accepted that even the most straight- 
7 It should be noted that the expression "natural kind" has sometimes been 
used in quite different ways. Quine, for instance, has used this expression in 
making the point that there are empirically discoverable distinctions in our 
"subjective quality space." (W. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in Ontological Relativity 
and Other Essays (New York and London, 1969), pp. 114-38.) These kinds, how- 
ever, depend on the particular nature of human observers, and not necessarily 
on objectively significant properties of the objects. They might, perhaps, 
better be referred to as "innate nominal kinds." Also, the discussion of species 
in the final section of the present paper could justify referring to species as 
"natural kinds"; not, however, in the present sense. 
8 J use the term "nominal essence" here very broadly to include definitions, 
criteria, clusters of symptoms, etc. I do not mean to imply that every kind. 
requires an essential property. 
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forwardly observational terms are to some extent "theory-laden," 
though the exact extent of this is much debated. At any rate, the 
general picture is of science as a largely autonomous activity, 
in spite of subtle and pervasive interactions with the main body 
of language. It is one of the great attractions of Putnam's essen- 
tialism that it promises to provide much stronger links between 
science and ordinary language, since many terms of the latter 
are shown to refer to kinds demarcated by the former. 
Putnam's theory resolves the meaning of a natural kind term 
into four components, referred to as a syntactic marker, a seman- 
tic marker, a stereotype, and an extension.9 To illustrate, the term 
"elephant" might have as syntactic marker "noun," as semantic 
marker "animal," as stereotype "large gray animal with flapping 
ears, a long nose, etc.," and an extension determined by the 
microstructural (or other theoretical) truth about elephants. It 
is with the last two of these, which are approximately equivalent 
to nominal and real essences, (the stereotype being the nominal 
essence, stripped of its reference-fixing function) that I will be 
concerned. 
The distinction between the stereotype and the extension is 
reflected in a distinction between mere competence in the use 
of a term, and (full) knowledge of the meaning of the term. The 
former requires only the first three components of meaning. In 
fact, the stereotype is explained as the set of features that must 
be known by any competent speaker of the language, regardless 
of whether it provides a good guide to the actual extension of 
the term.10 All this ignorant talk is facilitated by what Putnam 
describes as "the division of linguistic labour."" If, for any 
reason, it is important that items be assigned to the correct 
classes, it is necessary that there be experts familiar with the 
really essential properties of the kinds in question, and who are 
therefore able to perform this function. We generally take it on 
authority, for instance, whether something is made of gold. We 
may note, however, that we can never be sure even that the 
experts fully know the meaning of the term. For there is no 
9 MM, p. 269. 
'0MM, p. 250; ER, p. 204. 
"MM, pp. 227-29. 
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guarantee that they have yet got right the real essence of the kind 
in question. 
The central question raised by Putnam's analysis is how the 
nominal, or stereotypic, kinds of ordinary language are to be 
correlated with the natural kinds discovered by science. That is 
to say, granted that there are these real, empirically discoverable, 
natural kinds, how do we know which to assign to a particular 
term. Putnam answers this question by appealing to a previously 
unnoticed indexical component of meaning.12 This consists in 
the reference, in using a natural kind term, to whatever natural 
kind paradigmatic instances of the extension of the term "in our 
world" belong. Such a paradigm may be identified either osten- 
sively, or operationally through the stereotype. Having identified 
the paradigmatic exemplar, the kind is then defined as consisting 
of all those individuals that bear an appropriate "sameness 
relation" to this individual. This sameness relation is Putnam's 
exact equivalent of Locke's real essence. My fundamental objec- 
tion to the theory as a theory of biological kinds is that no such 
sameness relations suitable for Putnam's theory can be found in 
it. 
This concludes my exposition of Putnam's theory of natural 
kind terms. While I will argue that it is untenable, I should say 
now that there is much in it that I believe to be true. I am very 
ready to believe, in particular, that knowing the meaning of a 
term is something that admits of degrees, and that the higher 
degrees may only be achieved by experts. However, I do not think 
that experts can deliver on quite the task set for them by Putnam; 
and the task on which they can deliver, I think, is different in 
degree rather than in kind from what can be expected from a 
linguistically competent nonexpert. Before attempting to sub- 
stantiate these claims, I will conclude the present section with 
a brief consideration of the arguments that have been adduced 
by Putnam (and Kripke) in support of this kind of theory. 
The general methodology that Putnam adopts is to consider 
counterfactual situations in which we encounter an item that 
is in some interesting respect novel, and then to decide (intuit?) 
whether we would apply a particular term to it. The relevant 
2 MM, pp. 229-34. 
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cases may be divided into two classes: first, those in which an 
object satisfies the stereotype, but for theoretical reasons is ex- 
cluded from the extension, of a term; and second, those in which 
the theoretically important conditions are met, but part or all of 
the stereotype is not. I shall concentrate on cases of the first sort. 
A favorite example of Putnam's is set in a place called "Twin 
Earth." This remarkable place is identical to Earth in every 
respect, except that what is there called "water," a substance 
that plays exactly the role that water does on Earth and shares 
all the phenomenal properties of Earth water, turns out not to 
have the chemical composition H20, but to be some other com- 
plicated chemical substance, which may be called XYZ. Putnam's 
contention is that when we discovered this fact we would have to 
say that what they called "water" was not water, since water is, 
necessarily, H20. Being H20 is what constitutes the sameness 
relation for the natural kind, water. Since we have discovered 
that this is the appropriate sameness relation in our world, this 
fact has been incorporated in the very meaning of the term. The 
point I wish to emphasize here is a methodological one. If Put- 
nam says "XYZ is not water," and my intuition is that it would 
be (another kind of) water, how is such a dispute to be settled? 
Who knows what we ought to say in such a fantastic situation? 
Of course, the claim that XYZ would not be water must itself 
be intuitively plausible if it is to support, not merely illustrate, 
Putnam's theory. 
Perhaps it will be helpful to notice that scientific history 
encompasses similar, if less extreme, cases. Consider, for instance, 
the first European botanist to study North American trees. When 
he arrived he might have been interested to discover that there 
were beech trees on that side of the Atlantic. More careful in- 
vestigation would have told him that these beech trees differed 
from those he had previously encountered and in fact belonged 
to a distinct species. 13 Since the most striking difference between 
the two species was (perhaps) the size of the leaves, this discovery 
was commemorated in the distinction between Fagus sylvatica 
and the newly recognized Fagus grandifolia. In view of overwhelm- 
13 If it is objected that the concept of a species was very different when 
European botanists first reached America, I will make the modestly counter- 
factual assumption that America was first discovered in the 1970s. 
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ing similarities, there could have been little doubt about as- 
signing these trees to the genus Fagus (= beech). Let us suppose 
that our botanist was also a linguist. If a native had asked him 
whether there were beech trees where he came from, what ought 
he to have said? My intuition, for whatever it is worth, is that he 
should have said that there were; though naturally if he were 
talking to a native botanist, he would go on to add that European 
beech trees belonged to a different species. 
The purpose of this example is to suggest that plausible though 
some of Putnam's examples may be, they do admit of different 
interpretations. In the case of the water example it is also impor- 
tant to emphasize the great improbability of Putnam's hypoth- 
esis. All our scientific experience goes against the possibility 
of there being two substances that differed solely in having 
radically different molecular structures.14 But this should not 
blind us to the fact that if we do take the possibility seriously, 
the best way of accommodating it might be to admit that there 
were natural kinds that encompassed such radical differences 
of structure. After all, it is surely just the absence of experiences 
like the one Putnam describes that makes it reasonable to attach 
to molecular structure at least most of the importance that 
Putnam ascribes to it. 15 Perhaps no one will be persuaded to take 
this case the way I have suggested. But I hope that I have at least 
said enough to motivate a closer look at how such issues are, and 
can be, treated in scientific practice. 
II 
Putnam's theory requires that there be kinds discriminated 
by science appropriate for providing the extensions of certain 
kinds of terms in ordinary language. A very encouraging source of 
14 Indeed, if there is really no other difference, it is impossible to conceive 
of any ground there could be for postulating this difference. This may be seen 
as an example of what Schlesinger has called the Principle of Connectivity. 
(G. Schlesinger, Method in the Physical Sciences (London, 1963), ch. 3, pp. 73-105.) 
15 Much of this importance may be attributed to the fact that Putnam is, 
or was, a reductionist. A classic statement of reductionist philosophy of science 
is Putnam and Oppenheim's "The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis," 
in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, II, ed. H. Feigl and M. Scriven. 
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examples for this thesis is available in biology, and it is these 
examples that I want to consider. The part of biology that is 
concerned with the classification of biological organisms is 
taxonomy. Within taxonomy, an organism is classified by assign- 
ing it to a hierarchical series of taxa, the narrowest of which is 
the species.16 Thus a complete taxonomic theory could be dis- 
played as a tree, the smallest branches of which would represent 
species. Rules would be required for assigning individual organ- 
isms to species, and an individual that belonged to a particular 
species would also belong to all higher taxa in a direct line from 
that species to the trunk of the tree. (In practice, an organism is 
classified by assigning it to successively narrower taxa. But as 
will emerge, this does not reflect the theoretical relations of 
successive taxonomic levels.) Let us assume what might be 
called "taxonomic realism." This is the view that there is one 
unambiguously correct taxonomic theory. At each taxonomic 
level there will be clear-cut and universally applicable criteria 
that generate an exhaustive partition of individuals into taxa. 
Each individual will then have the essential properties of all the 
taxa to which it belongs. We may even assume that the appropri- 
ate number of taxonomic levels to recognize is somehow implicit 
in the nature of the organisms. The claim that there are natural 
kinds in biology demarcated by real essences (and afortiori Put- 
namian privileged sameness relations) would thus be entirely 
sustained. My first aim will be to show that even under these 
circumstances Putnam's theory faces serious difficulties of appli- 
cation. 
The central difficulty I have in mind is that it is far from uni- 
versally the case that the preanalytic extension of a term of 
ordinary language corresponds to any recognized biological 
taxon. (Of course, I am not assuming that present biological 
theory includes the best possible taxonomy. But there can be no 
reason to anticipate a general trend towards coincidence with 
ordinary language distinctions.) In a sense this claim is not easy 
to substantiate, because the general terms in question are in 
fact extremely vague, and their application indeterminate. How- 
16 For some purposes divisions into subspecies or varieties are required. For 
the present discussion these can safely be ignored. 
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ever, I think this indeterminacy can be seen to corroborate 
my thesis. 
The richest source of illustrations for this difficulty is the 
vegetable kingdom, where specific differences tend to be much 
less clear than among animals, and considerable developmental 
plasticity is the rule. Any observant person who has explored the 
deserts of the Southwest United States will have little difficulty 
distinguishing a prickly pear from a cholla. Yet taxonomically 
both these kinds of cacti belong to the same genus, Opuntia. Sev- 
eral species of this genus are certainly (to the ordinary man in 
the desert) prickly pears, and several are certainly chollas. Tax- 
onomy does not recognize any important relation between 
Opuntia polyacantha and Opuntiafragilis (two species of prickly pear) 
that either does not share with Opuntia bigelovia (a species of 
cholla). Ordinary language does make such a distinction, and on 
the basis of perfectly intelligible and readily perceptible criteria. 
Thus the property of being a prickly pear is just not recognized 
in biology. 
Or consider the lilies. Species which are commonly referred 
to as lilies occur in numerous genera of the lily family (Liliaceae). 
To take a few examples from the flora of the Western United 
States again, the Lonely Lily belongs to the genus Eremocrinum, 
the Avalanche Lily to the genus Eiythronium, the Adobe Lily to 
the genus Fritillaria, and the Desert Lily to the genus Hespero- 
callis. The White and Yellow Globe Lilies and the Sego Lily 
belong to the genus Calochortus; but this genus is shared with 
various species of Mariposa Tulips and the Elegant Cat's Ears 
(or Star Tulip). I would not want to undertake the task of describ- 
ing the taxonomic extension of the English term "lily." However, 
it is fairly clearly well short of including the entire family. To 
include the onions and garlics (genus AIlium, and, incidentally, 
another good example of the point of the previous paragraph) 
would surely amount to a debasement of the English term. 17 
It is not hard to find similar examples in the animal kingdom. 
The various species of chickadees and titmice share the same 
17 All the preceding examples may be found in R. Spellenberg, The Audubon 
Society Field Guide to North American Wildflowers, Western Region (New York, 1969). 
74 
BIOLOGICAL TAXA 
genus. Hawks probably comprise three of the four families in the 
order Falconiformae, though there are some questionable sub- 
families. Whether a kite, an eagle, or a caracara is a hawk is 
another futile debate I will not attempt to initiate, though I 
feel sure that a vulture is not. Moths are another particularly 
interesting example. The order Lepidoptera includes the subor- 
ders Jugatae and Frenatae. It appears that all the Jugatae are 
moths. The Frenatae, on the other hand, are further subdivided 
into the Macrolepidoptera and the Microlepidoptera. The latter 
seem again to be all moths. But the former include not only some 
moths but also (all) skippers and butterflies. 18 In this case it does 
seem possible to give a plausible account of the taxonomic ex- 
tension of the English word. The trouble is that the grouping so 
derived appears to be, from the taxonomic point of view, quite 
meaningless. 
A rather desperate attempt might be made to save the theory 
from such examples, by going for the best available taxon and 
accepting some revisionary consequences for ordinary language. 
Thus one might claim that the extension of "lily" was the whole 
family Liliaceae, or of moths the order Lepidoptera. We would 
just have to accept the fact that onions had turned out to be lilies, 
or butterflies moths. In defense of such claims, it could be pointed 
out that ordinary language has indeed come to accept such 
scientifically motivated changes as the rejection of the view that 
whales are fish in favor of the belief that they are mammals. But 
actually this example is by no means as clear-cut as is sometimes 
assumed. In the first place, "mammal" is more a term of bio- 
logical theory than of prescientific usage. One cannot recognize 
mammals at a glance, but must learn quite sophisticated criteria 
of mammalhood. "Fish," by contrast, is certainly a prescientific 
category. What is more doubtful is whether it is genuinely a 
postscientific category, for it is another term that lacks a tidy 
taxonomic correlate. I assume that the three chordate classes 
Chrondichthyes, Osteichthyes, and Agnatha would all equally 
be referred to as fish (unless sharks and lampreys are just as good 
nonfish as whales). But unless there is some deep scientific reason 
for lumping these classes together but excluding the class Mam- 
18 For moths, see D. Borror and R. White, A Field Guide to the Insects of North 
America North of Mexico (Boston, 1970), pp. 218 ff. 
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malia, the claim that whales are not fish might be a debatable one. 
Perhaps "fish" just means aquatic vertebrate, so that whales 
are both fish and mammals, and this well-worn example is just 
wrong. However, whales were never the most stereotypical fish, 
and it is easy to see the point of denying that they are fish at 
all: they do belong to a taxonomically respectable group most 
members of which do not remotely resemble fish. I see no parallel 
argument for the claim that butterflies are moths. 
The second difficulty for the application of Putnam's theory 
that occurs even against a background assumption of taxonomic 
realism, concerns the hierarchical structure of taxonomy. Put- 
nam's theory, it will be recalled, determines the extension of a 
natural kind term by means of a theoretical "sameness relation" 
to a suitable exemplar. Suppose we want to discover the ex- 
tension of the English word "beetle." A suitable exemplar will no 
doubt have to satisfy the condition that it be readily recognizable 
as a beetle by a linguistically competent layman; but probably 
this would not eliminate a very large proportion of the approxi- 
mately 290,000 recognized species. Any particular exemplar will 
belong to one particular species. Given taxonomic realism, there 
will then be some sameness relation that it displays to other 
members of that species, some relation that applies within its 
particular genus, and so on up, not just to the relation that holds 
between all members of the order Coleoptera, which is approxi- 
mately coextensional with the term "beetle," but beyond, as far 
as the relation that holds between it and all animals but no 
plants. One may well wonder how the appropriate sameness 
relation is supposed to be selected from these numerous alter- 
natives. 
One kind of solution to this difficulty does suggest itself. If 
we collected a sufficiently large number of beetles, as different 
from one another as was consistent with the stereotype, we could 
try to find the narrowest sameness relation that held between 
every pair of our specimens. This methodology would, of course, 
force us to identify moths with the order Lepidoptera, and accept 
the consequence that butterflies were a kind of moth. It also 
seems to me that collecting the set' of samples would involve 
attaching a lot of significance to the stereotype; if the stereotype 
were not a good guide to the real extension, it could hardly 
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work. Rather than pursue this suggestion, however, I will now 
take a more critical look at taxonomic realism. 
III 
I have not meant to deny that very many general terms for 
living organisms do have a reasonably clear taxonomic correlate. 
But to investigate the extent of this correlation, it is first necessary 
to say something about the word "ordinary." For almost all 
species of birds and large vertebrates, for many flowering plants, 
and for some species of fish and insects, there is something (or 
sometimes a list of things) referred to as a common name. It is 
not obvious whether these should be thought of as part of ordin- 
ary language, or as part of a technical vocabulary. Certainly if 
competence in English does not require enough biological know- 
how to distinguish a beech from an elm,19 then surely it cannot 
require an awareness even of the existence of the Solitary Pussy- 
toes, the Flammulated Owl, or the Chinese Matrimony Vine. If 
such charming terms are assigned with their Latin equivalents to 
scientific taxonomy, and we restrict our attention to terms with 
which the layman can reasonably be expected to be familiar, 
then one thing we will find is that where there is a recognizable 
corresponding taxon, it is generally of higher level than the 
species. 
For the case of large mammals, where human interest (and 
empathy) is at its highest, most familiar terms do refer to quite 
small groups of species; and common specific names are often 
widely known (as Blue Whale, Indian Elephant, or White-Tailed 
Deer). Most well-known names of trees refer quite neatly to 
genera, as, e.g., oak, beech, elm, willow, etc. (The various cedars, 
by contrast, are not closely related. It is reasonable to suppose 
that the term "cedar" has more to do with a kind of timber 
than with a biological kind.) With birds the situation is highly 
varied. Ducks, wrens, and woodpeckers form families. Gulls and 
terns form subfamilies. Kingbirds and cuckoos correspond to 
genera, while owls and pigeons make up whole orders. The 
American Robin, finally, is a true species, though it is interesting 
19 See MM, pp. 226-27. 
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that in Britain "robin" refers to a quite different species, and in 
Australia, I am told, it refers to a genus of flycatchers. For insects, 
where the number of species is much greater, and the degree of 
human interest generally lower, the mapping is predictably 
coarser. Such things as hump-backed flies, pleasing fungus 
beetles, brush-footed butterflies, and darkling beetles make up 
whole families (the last-named, for instance, having some 1,400 
known North American species). More familiar things, like 
beetles and bugs, refer to whole orders. (Must the competent 
speaker of (American) English know that a beetle is not a bug? 
Or is the word "bug" ambiguous?) 
The significance of the preceding point is that whereas there 
is an interesting case to be made for the reality of the species, there 
seems to be almost no case for taxonomic realism at any higher 
level of classification. Among biologists, bumperss" and splatterss" 
do indeed dispute such questions as how many genera are to be 
distinguished within a family. Such disputes may be based on 
estimates of morphological or physiological similarity within 
groups of species, or on considerations of practical utility for field 
classification; they do not appear to involve deep theoretical 
interests, or to embody the assumption that such questions 
admit of true or false answers. (There is a possible claim that such 
distinctions reflect phylogenetic matters of fact, but I will post- 
pone consideration of this suggestion.) 
It will be recalled that Putnam's theory requires that there be 
some sameness relation between any two members of a natural 
kind. This might be called a "privileged sameness relation" since 
it is not supposed to be just any relation that happens to demar- 
cate the kind, but rather some discoverable relation that con- 
stitutes the real nature of that kind. But biological theory offers 
no reason to expect that any such privileged relations exist, since 
higher taxa are assumed to be arbitrarily distinguished and do 
not reflect the existence of real kinds. This claim will be rein- 
forced in the final section of this paper, where I will argue that 
even for the case of species no privileged sameness relations exist. 
Since this is a rather more controversial question, however, I 
should emphasize that I do not think the argument against 
Putnam depends in any way on this question. For as I have 
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indicated, a species is seldom a candidate for the extension of an 
ordinary language term. 
To clarify my position on the relation between the species 
and higher taxa, I actually believe that the species is the only 
taxonomic level to which essential properties cannot be attrib- 
uted. This is not meant as a paradox. It is merely that higher taxa, 
having no real existence, are defined in scientific vocabulary by 
nominal essences. Thus I would hold that such statements as 
that birds have feathers, mammals suckle their young, or spiders 
have eight legs are analytic.20 But a nominal essence is not, in 
Putnam's sense, a privileged sameness relation. The reason that 
the same cannot be said of the species is that species, while 
lacking a real essence, do have a kind of real, objective existence. 
This will be explained in the final part of the paper. Meanwhile, 
there is one technical difficulty that may be raised against this 
account. Unless species have at least those properties that are 
essential to the higher taxa under which they are subsumed, 
it would appear that the relation between the species and the 
higher taxa cannot be subsumption. It might be sufficient to 
reply that a real essence is intended as a condition both necessary 
and sufficient for membership in a taxon, and this argument only 
shows that there are some necessary conditions. Since I am re- 
luctant to admit that there are even strictly necessary conditions 
for species membership, I prefer a different line. One may assume 
that species are assigned to higher taxa in toto, because a sufficient 
majority of their members display the appropriate properties. 
(Thus, for instance, women who feed their infants from bottles 
would still count as mammals, since they belong to a species of 
mammals.) Then one would fail to assign an individual to a 
higher taxon only in case one failed to assign it to a species. This 
does not seem an objectionable failure. 
20 This statement is considerably oversimplified. More strictly, we should 
say "anything that has feathers is a bird," etc., to accommodate plucked birds, 
male mammals, and paraplegic spiders. However, "anything that has eight 
legs is a spider" is neither analytic nor true. Further conditions that eliminate 
octopuses, crabs, etc., would be needed to construct a genuinely sufficient 
condition. Presumably the definition of a high level taxon will typically be 
quite complex, and perhaps sometimes disjunctive. 
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IV 
In this section I will make some more constructive suggestions 
about the relationship between the classifications of organisms in 
ordinary language (OLC) and in scientific taxonomy (TC). The 
natural way to contrast these classificatory schemes, it seems 
to me, is in terms of the different functions that they serve. 
The functions of OLC, unsurprisingly enough, are overwhelm- 
ingly anthropocentric. A group of organisms may be distin- 
guished in ordinary language for any of various reasons: because 
it is economically or sociologically important (Colorado beetles, 
silkworms, or Tsetse flies); because its members are intellectually 
intriguing (trap-door spiders or porpoises); furry and empathetic 
(hamsters and Koala bears); or just very noticeable (tigers and 
giant redwoods). This list could no doubt be extended almost 
indefinitely, which merely reflects the immense variety of human 
interests. From this standpoint many apparent anomalies be- 
tween OLC terms and TC terms are readily explicable. An ex- 
ample I mentioned earlier is illustrative here. It would be a 
severe culinary misfortune if no distinction were drawn between 
garlic and onions. But we have seen that this is not a distinction 
reflected in TC. Presumably there is no reason why taxonomy 
should pay special attention to the gastronomic properties of 
its subject matter. 
A slightly more elaborate example is the following. The taxo- 
nomic classes birds and mammals are both part of ordinary 
language (though the latter less clearly). By contrast, the much 
larger class of angiosperms (flowering plants) receives no such 
recognition. There is a very familiar term of ordinary language, 
"tree," the extension of which undoubtedly includes oak trees 
and pine trees (though perhaps not their seedlings). The exten- 
sion of the TC term "angiosperm," on the other hand, includes 
daisies, cacti, and oak trees, but excludes pine trees. It is no 
surprise that such a grouping finds few uses outside biology; for 
most purposes it is much more relevant whether something is a 
tree or not than whether its seeds develop in an ovary. This 
seems sufficient to explain why there is no taxonomic equivalent 
of "tree" and no ordinary language equivalent of "angiosperm." 
Where organisms are of little interest to nonspecialists, they 
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are typically coarsely discriminated in OLC. Thus it is that 
despite the vastly greater number of arthropod than vertebrate 
species, OLC distinguishes many more kinds of the latter. The 
factors I mentioned before may all apply here. Vertebrates are 
more likely to be useful (nutritious), interesting (empathetic), 
furry (useful), noticeable (big), etc. Thus arthropod classifica- 
tions in OLC typically cover enormous numbers of species. In 
fact, the useful distinctions tend to be more on the model of 
"small red beetle" and "large black beetle," than of specific 
identification. Still with this functionalist viewpoint in mind, 
we can also see that there may be other, specialized vocabularies 
that do not coincide with either TC or OLC. The vocabularies of 
the timber merchant, the furrier, or even the herbalist may in- 
volve subtle distinctions between types of organisms; there is no 
obligation that these distinctions coincide with those of the 
taxonomist. (Recall, for instance, my earlier suggestion about 
the term "cedar.") 
TC, hopefully, avoids this anthropocentric viewpoint. The 
number of species names is here intended to reflect the number 
of species that exist. Nonetheless, even here there is an anthro- 
pomorphic aspect. For an adequate taxonomy must not only 
meet theoretical constraints, but should also be practicably 
usable. The strongest theoretical constraints apply at the level 
of the species, for the obvious reason that this is the level with 
the greatest theoretical significance. Thus it has recently been 
recognized that a large number of groups that had been taken 
for species were in fact groups of very similar but distinct spe- 
cies. There is no requirement that taxonomy must be easy. 
A taxonomic system is not merely a list of species, but must 
also include a selection of features by which they are to be rec- 
ognized. Such features may be called "diagnostic." If it were 
possible to discover some privileged sameness relation for species, 
then clearly this relation should be used as diagnostic for the 
species. In the final part of this paper I will consider and reject 
some candidates for such a relation. For now I will assume that 
the existence of a species consists in the general cooccurrence 
21 For a discussion of these so-called "sibling species," see E. Mayr, Popula- 
tions, Species, and Evolution (Harvard, 1975), ch. 3. 
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of a large number of characteristics. If this is right, then the 
selection of diagnostic features must be greatly underdetermined, 
and hence, in a sense, arbitrary. Of course, there will be certain 
desiderata for such a choice, such as minimal developmental 
plasticity, or just ease of determination. In practice, a suitable 
feature or set of features is generally taken as providing a con- 
clusive identification. But this should not be taken as showing 
that the features selected are privileged. And indeed, a slight 
acquaintance with field biology suggests that even the best 
selected diagnostic features will occasionally fall foul of atypical 
specimens or obscure hybrids. 
If the contrast I have suggested between species and higher 
taxa is well founded, it would be misleading to apply the term 
"diagnostic feature" both to species and to higher taxa. For the 
latter, a better term would be "defining feature." As for the 
species, the fact that such a feature is not dictated by discoverable 
properties of the objects does not imply that there are no appro- 
priate standards for selecting defining features. Maximal evo- 
lutionary invariability is one desideratum that comes to mind. 
The position I would like to advocate might be described as 
promiscuous realism.22 The realism derives from the fact that 
there are many sameness relations that serve to distinguish classes 
of organisms in ways that are relevant to various concerns; the 
promiscuity derives from the fact that none of these relations 
is privileged. The class of trees, for example, is just as real as the 
class of angiosperms; it is just that we have different reasons for 
distinguishing them. It is true that in the case of species there is 
a largely, though not wholly, determinate range of classes that 
we are aiming to identify. The existence of species, I suggest, may 
be seen as consisting in the following fact. If it were possible 
to map individual organisms on a multidimensional quality 
space, we would find numerous clusters or bumps. In some parts 
of biology these clusters will be almost entirely discrete. In other 
areas there will be a continuum of individuals between the 
peaks. It can then be seen as the business of taxonomy to identify 
these peaks. This picture also makes it easy to see why the de- 
liverances of taxonomy need not provide the distinctions that are 
22 I am grateful to John Perry for suggesting this term. 
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relevant for more specialized interests. As is demonstrated by 
the existence of sibling species, the properties that covary in a 
species and distinguish it from other similar species may be very 
subtle (at least subtle enough to have escaped biologists for a 
long time). When the classificatory problem is approached from 
a more restricted point of view, that is, with an interest only in 
a certain range of properties, many peaks will disappear, while 
others may be emphasized. As an example of the former, analysis 
of the vocalizations of frogs have revealed numerous sibling 
species. But this hardly need be a matter of concern to the gour- 
met unless there are also variations in the texture or flavor of 
frogs' legs. Again, the gourmet puts more emphasis on the distinc- 
tion between garlic and onions than is implicit in taxonomy. 
Even within biology different interests call for the emphasis of 
different distinctions. Thus the primary unit of significance in 
ecology is not the species but the population. 
V 
In this concluding section I will defend the claim that privileged 
sameness relations cannot be found for the demarcation of the 
species. 23 At the same time, I hope to lend support to the positive 
characterization of the nature of species that was outlined in the 
previous section. While this account is certainly important for 
the general metaphysical position that I have just sketched, I 
should make clear that I do not think that the earlier claims 
about the relation between taxonomy and ordinary language 
depend upon the success of the present enterprise. These claims 
I take to be sufficiently established by the arguments adduced 
in Sections II and III of this paper. 
I will now review and criticize three strategies that might be 
attempted for identifying privileged sameness relations between 
23 The nature of species has received some discussion in the philosophical 
literature. For a view quite close to that presented here, see M. Ruse, "Defini- 
tions of Species in Biology," British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science, 20 (1969), 
97-119. See also, e.g., H. Lehman, "Are Biological Species Real?" Philosophy of 
Science, 34 (1967), 157-67; D. B. Kitts and D. J. Kitts, "Biological Species 
as Natural Kinds," Philosophy of Science, 46 (1979), 613-22. 
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the members of a species. These strategies are based, respectively, 
on intrinsic properties of the individuals, on reproductive isola- 
tion of a group of individuals, and on evolutionary descent of a 
group of individuals. They will be considered in that order. 
A traditional assumption that dates back at least to Aristotle is 
that organisms could be unambiguously sorted into discrete 
kinds on the basis of overt morphological characteristics. Since 
the theory of evolution undermined the belief in the fixity of 
species, this assumption has become increasingly untenable. It 
is now widely agreed that gross morphological properties are 
not sufficient for the unambiguous and exhaustive partition of 
individuals into species. 24 Crudely, this is because there is con- 
siderable intraspecific variation with respect to any such prop- 
erty, and the range of variation of a property within a species will 
often overlap the range of variation of the same property within 
other species. 
At the same time it is still sometimes thought that a more 
covert, probably microstructural, property could be discovered 
that would be adequate for the unambiguous assignment of 
individuals to species.25 More specifically, it may be thought 
that some description of the genetic material could capture a 
genuinely essential, or at least privileged, property.26 It is as- 
sumed that the morphological and physiological properties are 
causally conditioned by interaction between the organism's 
genetic endowment and its environment. Thus it is imaginable 
that all members of a species do share the same genetic blueprint, 
or one with certain essential features, but that intraspecific 
differences are attributable to differences in environmental 
factors. But it is equally possible that there should be as much or 
more genetic variability as morphological variability. That is, 
intraspecific genetic variability may overlap interspecific varia- 
tion as much as, or more than, morphological variability does. 
In fact, there are good reasons for supposing this to be the case. 
There are various reasons why evolution should favor species 
with a high degree of genetic variability. In the first place, a 
24 For a much more detailed discussion of this fact, see Mayr, op. cit., ch. 2. 
25 Kitts and Kitts, op. cit., argue that there must be such a property, while 
admitting that we do not yet know what it is. 
26E.g., by Putnam. See SP, p. 141. 
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reserve of genetic variety may enable the species to survive 
changing environmental conditions. A species, in other words, 
may be able to produce individuals suited to a variety of environ- 
mental situations. Second, it appears that heterozygous indi- 
viduals (i.e., individuals with pairs of different genes at various 
loci) are often better adapted than homozygous individuals. 
(The more invariant the genetic material, of course, the less 
heterozygosity is possible.) A classic example of this is provided 
by sickle cell anaemia. Only those individuals that are hetero- 
zygous with respect to this gene are able both to produce viable 
blood cells, and to exhibit a high resistance to a form of sub- 
tertian malaria which is prevalent in those areas where the gene 
in question is commonest. More generally, it is supposed that 
heterozygosity provides a way of increasing the diversity of the 
biochemical resources of an individual. Finally, it is believed 
that there are homeostatic developmental mechanisms whereby 
differing gene combinations approximate the production of the 
same phenotype.27 This last point both accounts for the possi- 
bility that genetic variation might excede phenotypic variation, 
and also emphasizes why it would be mistaken to suppose that 
the genetic material was in any way privileged with respect to 
intraspecific homogeneity. Of course, there are other micro- 
structural features that could be supposed to be especially 
favored in this respect, such as the presence of particular proteins, 
lipids, or whatever. But there is no reason to expect that any such 
properties enjoy a privileged status with respect to variability. 
Much importance is attached in theoretical biology to the 
notion of reproductive isolation. It is suggested that a species 
can be defined as a group of interbreeding individuals, reproduc- 
tively isolated from all other individuals; this is often referred 
to as the "biological" species concept, and may be considered 
a second candidate for providing a privileged relation between 
members of a species. Set against the desirability of genetic 
variation, there is a need for a species to maintain the integrity 
of a well-adapted gene pool. This requires insulation against the 
introgression of alien genes. Furthermore, it is generally sup- 
27 See Mayr, op. cit., p. 133. Not surprisingly, sibling species are particularly 
likely to display strong developmental homeostasis. 
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posed that the process of speciation is not completed until effec- 
tive mechanisms have been established to prevent such intro- 
gression.28 Thus there is a certain sense in which reproductive 
isolation is an essential property of the species: the species would 
not have come into existence if it had not, to a sufficient degree, 
acquired this property. The important point here is that this is a 
property of the species, or gene pool, but only secondarily of the 
individuals that make up the species. An obvious way to make 
this point is to observe that bullocks or worker bees are not dis- 
barred from species membership merely by virtue of being 
reproductively isolated from everything. This consideration is 
not, of itself, very convincing. Elaboration of the proposed crite- 
rion in terms of ancestral or other reproductive links to members 
of the interbreeding, but isolated, group might accommodate 
such cases. But deeper obstacles stand in the way of such a course. 
Adequate reproductive isolation of a species does not require 
complete isolation of all its members. Hybridization occurs 
throughout the natural world, though more particularly among 
plants, fishes, and amphibians. (A recently publicized case of suc- 
cessful mating between two monkeys of different species has 
brought this fact to more general attention.) This need not lead to 
significant gene introgression. In some cases hybrid individuals are 
sterile. In more complex cases there may be a band of hybridiza- 
tion where the geographic ranges of two species meet. (A readily 
noticeable example occurs with primroses and cowslips.) In such 
cases the continued existence of the two species is made possible 
by the competitive superiority of each within its preferred range. 
Since this superiority will normally apply also over hybrids, the 
alien genes will not penetrate much beyond the area of overlap. 
Thus the suggestion that this criterion for species provides a 
privileged relation between its constituent individuals fails on 
two counts. First, there will be individuals that would not be 
assigned to any species on this criterion; and second, there will 
be reproductive links connecting individuals that certainly 
belong to different species. The latter point is reinforced by the 
fact that the ability to produce viable offspring is not transitive. 
There exist chains of species, any two adjacent members of which 
28 For a discussion of speciation, see Mayr, op. cit., chs. 15 and 16. 
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can produce viable offspring, but the terminal members of which 
are not able to interbreed. Finally, as has often been observed, 
this criterion is completely useless for asexual species, since it 
would imply that every asexual organism constituted an entire 
species. 
The third, and final, proposal I will consider is one based 
directly on evolutionary history. The underlying idea is that it 
should be possible, in theory, to construct a family tree for all 
life on Earth. It is then hoped that the classificatory taxonomic 
tree could converge on this phylogenetic tree. Hence any taxon 
will correspond to an historically real evolutionary process. This 
proposal has the considerable advantage that it appears to be 
equally applicable to the species and to higher taxa. Since it is 
certainly hoped that taxonomy and phylogeny should at least 
be mutually illuminating, this suggestion is in some sympathy 
with biological theory. 
Two preliminary points should be made about this proposal. 
First, the essential or privileged property in question is highly 
extrinsic to the individuals to which it may be supposed to apply. 
Not only does it offer no hope of examining individuals and 
determining to which taxa they belong, but indeed nothing short 
of the entire evolutionary history of the organism will suffice 
for such a determination. The second point is related, though 
more speculative. The vast improbability that such a phylo- 
genetic tree could ever be constructed does not seem wholly 
irrelevant. Much of the necessary theorizing depends upon traces 
left by organisms in the very distant past. The circumstances 
under which such traces remain are quite unusual, and the vast 
majority of organisms that ever existed probably left no trace 
whatever. (I suppose a determinist might be driven to deny this. 
But that, I think, is a problem for determinism.) Thus this is a 
case in which the underdetermination of a theory by all available 
evidence seems particularly probable. It is very likely that insist- 
ing on a phylogenetic criterion of taxon membership would make 
taxonomy literally impossible. 
To assess the present hypothesis it is first necessary to explain 
how a taxonomic tree could also be interpreted as an evolution- 
ary tree. This requires that something be said about speciation. 
Qua taxonomy, each taxon also includes all the lower taxa 
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"descended" from it. Thus the American Robin belongs simul- 
taneously to the species migratorius, the genus Turdus, the family 
Turdidae, etc. The present suggestion interprets this as also 
embodying an evolutionary hypothesis. A species is composed of 
a number of populations that may be more or less differentiated 
from one another, both genetically and morphologically. When a 
population acquires some characteristic that isolates it genetically 
from the rest of the species, it is said to have achieved the status 
of a species. Thus the relevant evolutionary hypothesis would 
assert that at one time "turdidae" would have referred merely 
to a population of a larger species. Subsequently, this population 
would have achieved full species status, and still later divided 
into further species which now constitute the various genera in 
the family Turdidae. The particular genus Turdus, in turn, must 
have divided into further species, of which one is migratorius. 
It remains to be seen whether this phylogenetic interpretation 
of the taxonomic tree can do anything to supply the taxon with 
a real essence, or privileged internal relation. Against the sug- 
gestion that evolutionary history could be essential to members 
of a taxon, one might deploy a Putnam-Kripke type argument. 
If, say, a chicken began to lay perfectly ordinary walnuts which 
were planted and grew into walnut trees, I would not wish to 
refer to this result as the production of a grove of chickens. If 
accepted, this intuition shows that the right ancestry is not a 
sufficient condition for taxon membership. My intuition, more- 
over, is that the trees in question might prove to be genuine 
walnut trees, which is to deny that ancestry is even a necessary 
condition. However, having expressed suspicion of this style of 
argument, I do not want to rest any weight on this example of 
it. A more general argument is the following. Any sorting pro- 
cedure that is based on ancestry presupposes that at some time 
in the past the ancestral organisms could have been subjected 
to some kind of sorting. One can imagine drawing up a phylo- 
genetic tree and naming some branch of it; but the objective 
reality of the branch can be no greater than the objective reality 
of the grouping of organisms that constitutes the beginning 
of the branch. But I have claimed that, given all the organisms 
existing at a single time, there are no privileged properties or 
relations by means of which these can be sorted unambiguously 
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and exhaustively into objectively significant classes. In short, the 
phylogenetic criterion must be parasitic on some other, syn- 
chronic, principle of taxonomy. It cannot generate privileged 
properties on its own. 
As I have tried to stress, I do not mean to claim that species are 
unreal; only that they lack essential properties, and that their 
members cannot be distinguished by some privileged sameness 
relation. In fact, the existence of discrete species is one of the most 
striking and least disputable of biological data. If one examines 
the trees or birds in a particular area, it is apparent that these 
fall into a number of classes that differ from one another in 
numerous respects. But the essentialist conclusion that one might 
be tempted to draw from this fact is dissipated first by more 
careful study, which reveals that these distinguishing character- 
istics are by no means constant within the classes, and second 
by extending the scope of the investigation in both space and 
time, whereupon the limitations both of intraspecific similarity 
and interspecific difference will become increasingly apparent. 
I think that a closer look at the nature of evolutionary history 
may help to clarify the position I am trying to present. Evolution- 
ary history may indeed be perspicuously displayed in the form of 
a tree. Forks in the tree may be taken to represent the establish- 
ment of mechanisms for reproductive isolation between popu- 
lations of a species, and unbroken lines to represent species that 
exist at a given time. If we interpret this tree as a graph whose 
abscissa is a measure of time, and whose ordinate represents some 
very complicated property measure, 29 then the lines can be taken 
as representing average members of the species. If we were to try 
and plot individual organisms on the same graph, presumably 
these would be distributed around the lines in a normal statistical 
way. Here we may note various complications of which. the 
model should take account. First, the distance between the lines 
will be highly variable. In the case of higher mammals, for 
instance, the lines are generally well spaced. Thus there are few 
borderline cases for the application of such terms as "man" or 
29 Strictly, this must be envisaged as multidimensional. The present simpli- 
fication is merely for expository ease. The present account offers at least a 
partial justification for the program of numerical taxonomy, for which see 
R. Sokol and P. Sneath, Principles of Numerical Taxonomy (San Francisco, 1963). 
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"tiger." If we take a number of sibling species of fruit flies, on 
the other hand, the lines may be very close together. This enables 
us to see how the number of species can be a determinate matter, 
whereas the assignment of individuals to species may be only 
partially determinate. For an analysis of the distribution of 
various properties of these fruit flies could reveal a series of 
sharply defined means, whereas some individuals might lie 
between the means for most properties. On the graphic model, 
some individuals will occupy positions intermediate between 
two (or in a multidimensional model, many) lines. 
A further complication is that the process of speciation is not 
an instantaneous one. Also there are rare cases of two species 
merging. This, too, will be a gradual process. What this implies 
is that even when we draw a line through the taxonomic tree 
at a precise moment in time, the number of species in existence 
will not be wholly determinate. For where there are species in the 
process of dividing or merging, it will not be a determinable 
question whether there are two species or only one in existence 
at that time. This complication reveals a curious analogy with 
the preceding one. For again, there is a slightly different per- 
spective from which essentially the same question does admit 
of a determinate answer. Retrospectively, at least, it should be 
possible to say how many species existed during a certain period. 
For we can see whether species did in fact succeed in separating 
or merging during that period. 
It is satisfying that this picture indicates a role for each of the 
proposed defining characteristics I have been discussing, in 
accounting for the existence of, and describing the nature of, the 
species. I believe that it also vindicates the reality of the species 
in a way that shows why none of these features can be sufficient 
to define the members of a species. And finally, as a consequence 
of this last point, it appears that even if terms of ordinary lan- 
guage did refer to species, Putnam's theory of natural kind terms 
could still not be applied to them. 
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